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Pervasive new technologies associated with ICTs and software are dominated by a restricted 
oligopoly of US-based corporations. The challengers are not any longer European firms, but rather 
Japanese or Chinese companies. The actions taken by the EU to fill this technology gap, including 
the EC Framework Programmes, are beneficial but still insufficient in terms of the resources 
committed. This article argues that the EU urgently needs to add another economic policy 
instrument to defy these incumbent firms, namely to create a few publicly supported large 
corporations in the areas of greater scientific and technological opportunities. This will be 
complementary to the already ongoing mission-oriented innovation policies. While we are aware of 
the political and economic difficulties to implement such a strategy, we recall the pioneering 
venture of Airbus, established more than 50 years ago and which, despite several economic and 
political controversies, has successfully managed to challenge the dominant US-based passengers’ 
aircraft producers. Could similar attempts be replicated for Green technologies, Healthcare services, 
ICTs, and Artificial Intelligence? 
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Can the European economic recovery be knowledge-intensive? 
 
There is a consensus that Europe will start a solid recovery after the Covid-19 crisis only if 
supported by remarkable direct government intervention. The existing policy instruments at the 
national and the European levels, and most notably those made available with the Recovery Fund, 
have the aim to support and boost economic, technological, social, and cultural development. 
One of the core issues to enhance the European economy is to bridge the scientific and 
technological gap of the EU vis-à-vis the United States and Japan, also because these competencies 
are needed to sustain rising industries. We know that the EU is composed of very heterogeneous 
countries and while some of them are very R&D intensive, others are lagging. Overall, the EU has a 
lower R&D to GDP intensity than those of the USA and Japan and it is now challenged by 
emerging countries such as China (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
R&D intensity and Gross Domestic Expenditure of China, Japan, EU28 and the United States 





For several decades the EU has carried out a battery of actions to enhance education, science, 
technology, and innovation. Specifically, the EU Framework Programmes started in 1984 tried to 
foster European capabilities in promising technological areas. Among them, a crucial role has been 
devoted to supporting the ICT cluster, perhaps because it was considered an enabling technology on 
which the overall economic prosperity depended. Unfortunately, the gap with the USA is still 
substantial. The EU Framework Programmes have played a crucial role in creating capabilities 
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universities, but they have not managed to close the gap, nor they could have achieved alone such a 
demanding task. 
The overall economic consequences of the 2008 financial crisis also affected science and 
technology. The EU level of investment – one of the main carriers of innovation – was still below 
its 2008 level when the Covid-19 crisis broke out. In many EU member countries, public 
investment, rather than act anti-cyclically, decreased even more than the business investment. The 
EU tried to sustain the total level of investment with the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI), but this also proved to be insufficient (Archibugi et al., 2020). 
The current and post-Covid-19 instruments, including the European Recovery Fund, will eventually 
provide massive resources to support public investment plans and a substantial part will be devoted 
to R&D and innovation. But the bulk of these resources will be managed by national authorities 
under a European Commission supervision and not, like the Framework Programmes, directly by 
the European Commission. 
This article asks the question: can the EU fill the technology gap through public investments and 
incentives to R&D and innovation without also attempting to create enterprises in high-tech 
industries? We doubt it. Our view is that the interventions aimed to finance and support the 
activities of the existing institutions and firms are certainly useful, yet something more is needed: a 
cluster of new firms able to contribute to the generation of technological opportunities and, above 
all, the capacity to transform them into viable commercial products, processes, and services. 
A comparison with China is certainly instructive. China has substantially increased the resources 
devoted to education, R&D, and innovation, but to exploit this investment economically, it is 
bolstering new companies able to compete with the Big Tech American corporations, especially in 
the new strategic industries. In comparison, the EU response is much feebler. 
 
 
The EU regional dimension in scientific and technological capabilities 
 
The problem of the EU is that it is a highly heterogeneous area. Differently from the United States 
or China, it has not the powerful governance devices which characterize nation-states yet. The 
various FP programs were forced to balance two opposite objectives. On the one hand, their goal 
was to enhance scientific and technological competencies of the core areas to support European 
industry's competitiveness against foreign countries. On the other hand, they aimed to foster the 
development of competencies in the catching-up areas. 
 
Regional imbalances in technological capabilities in the EU are very severe. Whereas some timid 
signs of convergence have occurred because of the Framework Programmes, regions' contributions 
to the overall generation of new knowledge are very asymmetric (Archibugi et al., 2021). Eastern 
European countries, despite their attempt to better integrate into the overall EU scientific and 
technological communities, have registered small signs of progress in enhancing their innovative 
capacity. This indicates that the transition from a planned to a market economy has been harder than 
expected, especially concerning technological developments. Southern European regions continue 
to be far away from the Northern Europeans and have accumulated increased delays in the 






Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that having a strong, influential network position in 
collaborative EU research greatly affects participation in Horizon 2020 projects (Enger, 2018). The 
presence of these "closed clubs" has often been at the expense of the less influential Higher 
Education Institutions prevalently located in the periphery of Europe, leading to a vicious spiral in 
which established institutions have acquired more funds and reinforced their position. 
 
Therefore, the EU has to face a strenuous mission. On the one hand, it should foster EU scientific 
excellence and technological capabilities vis-à-vis a fiercer global competition with established 
countries like the United States and Japan, and with emerging countries like China and India. On 
the other hand, it should also increase EU cohesion by reducing technological disparities across its 
regions and industries. The two objectives are somehow in conflict with each other. The former 
may require a further concentration of competencies in the already most emancipated areas to 
compete with leading technological poles such as Silicon Valley, Route 128, Samsung town, or 
Shenzhen, the latter nurture capabilities of the least developed regions and sectors. 
 
What are the instruments available at the EU level? One of the most relevant are certainly the 
Framework Programmes and it is very likely that the coming Horizon Europe (2021-27) will have 
to ponder two choices: 
 
• To reduce disparities by fostering the distribution of knowledge also in peripheral areas and 
comparatively weaker sectors; 
 
• To challenge the dominance of the US and China by enhancing the excellence of selected 
players and areas.  
  
The Horizon 2020 project, just ended, was one of the world's largest public schemes supporting new 
knowledge development. Despite the massive resources made available by the EU to enhance 
scientific and technological capabilities, especially in enabling technologies, they merely 
corresponded to the yearly equivalent budget of the R&D investment of large corporations such as 
Amazon, Alphabet, Volkswagen, or Samsung. While the Horizon 2020 yearly budget was about 
13.2 billion Euros, large corporations such as Amazon (21.2), Alphabet (18.3), Samsung (14.8 
billion euros), Microsoft (14.7), Volkswagen (13.6), or Huawei (12.7) alone spend more or 
comparable amounts (see Table 1). 
 
While Horizon Europe is an excellent financial instrument to generate and disseminate 
competencies across the EU, it will not be able single-handed to create a genuine industrial capacity 











Source: Elaborations on the EU Industrial R&D investment Scoreboard (2019) and EU expenditure and Revenue 2014-
2020, available at https://ec.europa.eu/budget/graphs/revenue_expediture.html. For Amazon, we use the data provided 
by Skillicorn, 2020. 
 
 
Can European Union set up large corporations in enabling technologies? 
 
There is widespread consensus on whether the state should be a vigilant referee of the competitive 
process through regulations and anti-trust policies. By contrast, there is much more debate on its 
role as a direct economic player in a market economy. A daring perspective is that European 
governments should actively participate in the decisions concerning industrial policy strategies, 
rather than simply act as a regulator (see for example Cimoli et al., 2015, and the other contributors 
to the Intereconomics forum). There are several industrial policies that governments carry out to 
reinforce the presence in innovative industries (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). But the EU as a whole, 
with the support of national governments, should attempt to add another economic policy 
instrument, namely the generation of new firms in the emerging and enabling technologies. 
 
“National champions”, i.e. large corporations able to compete in the global markets, need the 
support of a proper national government to survive (Strange, 1991), especially if they are associated 
with complex knowledge infrastructures (Mazzucato, 2013). But fresh national champions would 
have insufficient strength to compete with the incumbent American and Chinese corporations, also 
because they may receive political protection by the government of their own country only. 
European fast-growing companies and start-ups, especially in ICTs and related sectors, could easily 
be acquired by the biggest companies in terms of market capitalization (market value) and liquid 
assets (see Rikap and Lundvall, 2020). American Big Tech have already acquired promising 
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European start-ups, a strategy that is widely used to obtain quick and easy access to new 
technologies and retain market dominance (Marks, 2017). If new start-ups are acquired by foreign 
big-tech firms, they will indirectly provide public support for the technological advancement of 
foreign competitors. As shown in Table 1, none of the R&D largest spenders with gigantic market 
capitalisation is based in Europe. 
 
The policy implication is quite straightforward: to become a challenger in high-tech, we need new 
publicly supported corporations at the continental level. Has ever happened that European countries 
have joined their forces to create companies able to enter new industries competing with the United 
States? It has happened seldom, but there are two important cases to be reminded of: Concorde, 
which started as a French – British venture in 1969, and Airbus, which began as a French–German 
venture also in 1969. 
 
 
Lessons from the past: Concorde and Airbus 
 
Back in the 1960s, the European governments’ decision to produce airplanes was finalized to enter 
as a third player between the two-dominant rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. The two 
superpowers developed competitive airplanes because of military purposes and subsequently 
adopted them to civilian transportation. Since European countries were not any longer military 
leaders, they lacked this capacity. The vulnerability of the European industry, specifically in 
aircraft, created the political conditions to build-up new ventures. Many commentators believed that 
without them, Western Europe would have been marginalized in the international division of labor 
(see, for instance, the influential book by Servan-Schreiber, 1968). 
 
The launch of the Concorde by Aerospatiale (France) and BAe (UK) - a jet engine passenger 
aircraft developed during the 1960s and introduced in 1969 - was one of the first-ever 
collaborations within the European context, even if took place outside the institutions of the 
European Economic Community (in 1969 the UK was not yet a member of the European Economic 
Community). Concorde was born because the French and British empires joined their forces to 
compete with the Soviet Tupolev Tu-144 to produce supersonic transport aircraft. This 
collaboration is indeed an example of a combination of two existing national trajectories. At the 
time, France was specialized in jet technology (for military purposes), and the UK had a long record 
in the passenger market. 
 
While Concorde was a technological success, it ended up being an economic failure. Twenty 
airplanes only were manufactured, seven of which acquired by British Airways and seven for Air 
France, the respective flag airline companies. Although the product was well designed and 
prestigious, it turned to be a commercial fiasco, mainly due to its impressive consumption and 
maintenance costs. 
 
The second example is the European Airbus consortium, which started developing aircraft in the 
1970s. Airbus has been economically successful and, after half a century, has managed to create a 
European firm dominant in the industry. Set up as a French-German venture in 1969, Airbus rapidly 
became a transnational consortium involving Aerospatiale and BAe, the German firm DASA and 





Economic Community. Its success has paved the way for new European networks, such as Avions 
de Transport Regional (ATR), and recently Aero International Regional (AIR).1 
 
Airbus challenged the American incumbent airplane manufacturers, all subsidized for military 
purposes (Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas). Similarly, European governments 
responded with subsidies for R&D, fiscal incentives, and political support to urge airline companies 
to purchase from Airbus rather than US producers. This led to a fierce Atlantic commercial rivalry 
between the European Union and the United States, and the governments of each side supported 
their companies. 
 
Airbus’ rivalry with Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas led to intense contentious already in the 
GATT about the role of public funding in generating 'unfair' competition. These cases were later 
discussed at the WTO, with the US government complaining about the European R&D subsidy to 
Airbus and the EU because of the US military procurement to Boeing. Eventually, focusing on the 
civilian component, Airbus managed to generate and maintain cheaper and consumer-friendly 
airplanes. In 1994 for the first time, Airbus sold more commercial aircraft than Boeing and in 2016 
became the first world company in the sector. Without Airbus, currently, the world market in civil 
airplanes would be a monopoly in the hands of a single US corporation, Boeing. 
 
Aviation has witnessed a rapid acceleration in transnational networks among firms developing high-
risk innovations, and other knowledge-intensive industries have followed the same route. The 
question here is why countries ought to collaborate. From an evolutionary perspective, one expects 
that countries in cross-border collaborations recombine their national specialization pattern. To the 
extent that two countries are specialized in different technology/market combinations globally, they 
can collaborate in two ways. Either they recombine the technology in which they are specialized, 
with the market in which the other country is specialized or vice versa. The recombination of 
specialization patterns allows partners to explore new technology/market trajectories collectively. 
 
When Airbus was set off, France had just switched its technological base from jets to turbofans, 
while the UK was already specialized in passenger aircraft (Frenken, 2000). Hence, previous 
specialization patterns reflect the techno-economic specialization of the transnational network. 
However, concerning the other two countries, Germany had lost its expertise in aircraft after the end 
of WWII and Spain had little experience. For these countries, Airbus provided an opportunity to 
leave their old specialization pattern and to enter a new market segment using state-of-the-art 
technology. Airbus's entry into the aircraft passenger market may be conceived respectively as a 
reshuffle of competencies for some countries and a developing strategy for others. Overall, 
governments provided the political support, the financial resources, and the expertise, but without a 
company, it would have been impossible to enter into such a complex and protected market. This 
demonstrates that when entrepreneurs are not willing to bear risks, the government should intervene 
directly. 
 
While there was an initial underestimation of the beneficial effects of Airbus's entry into the 
aviation market (Neven and Seabright, 1995), after half a century it can be considered a vital 
political and economic choice which produced benefits not only for Europe, but for the whole 
																																																								
1	 In	 military	 aircraft,	 European	 collaborations	 date	 back	 to	 Panavia,	 established	 in	 1969,	 and	 extended	 to	






world, USA included. A new venture in a fast-growing industry impeded that the sector ended up in 
a worldwide monopoly. 
 
 
Choosing the new emerging industries 
 
The current American-dominated oligopoly in ICTs has strong similarities with the situation of 
commercial aircraft of the 1960s. But ICTs are today much more relevant for current and future 
economic development. Not only are nations that depend on foreign corporations in strategic areas 
such as communications, satellites, data, social networks, and artificial intelligence more 
vulnerable, but they also lose their technological sovereignty (Edler et al., 2020). 
 
It is certainly not easy to identify the crucial sectors which will be indispensable for future 
economic, social, and political life. One may wonder why shoes and champagne are less relevant 
than satellites and vaccines, provided that the former is as lucrative as the others. And the fact that 
the EU has a persistent commercial surplus with the United States, even if none of the Big Tech 
companies is located in Europe, may dismiss the urgency to enter these high-tech sectors. But some 
sectors are likely to play a paramount role in future economic competitiveness. 
 
There are many ways in which economists can contribute to identifying the strategic industries of 
the future. The first is to consider the growth rate of production and productivity. But when 
statistics show that production starts increasing exponentially, the position of nations in the 
international division of labor has already been established and it is difficult to revert it. For this 
reason, one may need to use indicators that anticipate the upcoming scientific and technological 
opportunities. By looking at the degree of dynamism and the level of the pervasiveness of scientific 
and technological sectors, it is possible to anticipate which industries will be dominant in the future. 
The fast-growing classes of academic papers and patents often indicate the most rewarding 
scientific and technological areas (Meliciani, 2001). The level of pervasiveness - defined by the 
variety of users across industries – indicates those enabling technologies that will be necessary for 
the delivery of most products, processes and services (Evangelista et al., 2018). These areas are 
likely to be those where innovations lead to organizational and social changes to the extent that can 
be seen as the backbones of a new techno-economic paradigm (Freeman and Louçâ, 2001). 
 
Policymakers do not necessarily wait for experts' recommendations to decide where to invest. It is 
self-evident that in crucial areas, such as computers and smartphones, the market share of EU 
corporations is very tiny. EU citizens rely on American social networks, while its institutions have 
serious difficulties obtaining regulations to protect their data enforced and proper tax paid. While 
China has succeeded in entering new lucrative fields such as smartphones with Huawei and social 
networks with Tik Toc, the EU has lost its competitive companies (think about Olivetti for 
computers or Nokia for cell phones) or not even tried to enter into the market of social networks. 
Similar problems apply for e-commerce: Amazon dominates the European market without being 
challenged, while China has maintained at least its internal market through Ali Baba. In new 
enabling sectors like Artificial Intelligence, the EU investment rate is much below not only that of 
the USA but also Japan and China, and, above all, it does not seem that there will be an EU 
company to gain prominence shortly (Zachary et al., 2020). 
 
We are not arguing that generating new continental public corporations should be the only industrial 
policy response to affirm the EU presence in the world economy. In other cases, different attempts 









Capacity building in an extended industrial network: the case of the European Battery 
Alliance	
 “In Europe, within this decade, where it is technologically and economically viable, everything that 
can be electrified will be electrified, thus making battery technology one of the most important key 
enablers for the green energy transition facilitating existing and new technologies”.2 It is difficult to 
disagree with such a statement, especially since the European Commission’s target is to achieve a 
successful transition to a fossil-free society, as contemplated by the Green Deal. 
The European Commission launched in 2017 the European Battery Alliance (EBA) in the spirit of 
one of its Mission-oriented Public Programs (Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018, Mazzucato, 2018, 
2019).3 Industrial alliances allow to facilitate tighter cooperation and joint action among interested 
actors, bringing together a wide array of players in a given industry or value chain, including public 
and private players and civil society. The battery industry does not necessarily require large 
producers. The common knowledge-base is applied to very different products and markets that 
include specialized operators, general-purpose users, and consumers. To catch up, a laggard 
economic area should carry out a variety of actions, and the EU has used several integrated 
instruments to develop prominence in this specific industry. 
The first EU decision in this area is allowing national governments to provide state aids up to 2.9 
billion euros. Like any custom union, EU institutions have the mandate to prevent member states 
aid that could alter competition. But when state aid is directed towards capacity building, especially 
in emerging areas in which the EU is lagging behind its competitors, the resources provided by 
national authorities could be advantageous to all members, and they deserve benevolent 
consideration. 
 
The second is to promote the widespread collaboration and dissemination of the knowledge 
generated across a wide range of players across countries. This was carried out by fostering 
cooperation and also by dedicating targeted resources within the Horizon 2020 scheme “Next-
generation batteries” and similar actions contemplated in Horizon Europe. These ventures will at 
the same time contribute to both collaborative research and innovation ventures and dissemination 
of knowledge across players. 
  
The third is to provide loans at negligible interest rates for the battery value ventures through the 
European Investment Bank. Since 2010, battery projects financed by the EIB totalled 950 million 
euros and fostered 4.7 billion euros of overall project costs. The EIB involvement has significantly 
stepped up the financing of all the battery value chain stages, ranging from R&D, raw materials 
extraction and processing to battery production, e-charging infrastructure, and recycling. 
  
																																																								








The combination of grants, collaborative ventures, advantageous loans and regulations, together 
with the commitment to support the industry for several years, will hopefully be successful to make 
the EU a world leader in batteries. But such a strategy could be less effective when there is the need 
to affirm a remarkable fresh presence in restricted oligopolistic markets. In such cases, if the EU 
wishes to enter into the market dominated by the US big tech, a more active role is needed, namely 






Do large public firms or the environment conduce to start-ups? 
 
Provided that the European Union is a laggard area in knowledge-driven industries, it may be 
wondered whether the best strategy is either to use public resources and political power to 
generating ex-novo fresh companies or to create an environment conducive to facilitating high-tech 
start-ups, some of which could grow surfing over new technological opportunities. The recent 
American history indicates that during a technological revolution there is space for the birth of 
hundreds and hundreds of start-ups, although only a few managed to grow up to the point to 
become gigantic. 
 
Europeans should certainly meditate on the reasons why the Big Tech companies of our age - 
Amazon, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft - are all American-born start-ups while none of 
them comes from the EU. Research in this area has indicated several reasons: i) the availability of 
scientific and technological opportunities in the USA, often fostered by public intervention; ii) the 
presence of a strong entrepreneurial spirit; iii) a capital market willing to finance risky projects in 
daring ventures. The EU should certainly aim to improve the overall business environment for start-
ups, especially those devoted to far-sighted projects.  
 
But at this stage, it is very unlikely that European start-ups will regain the market so resolutely hold 
by foreign companies. First of all, because large American companies, as already noted, have the 
financial resources to acquire any potential challenger. Indeed, they regularly scan new ideas and 
are eager to further enlarging their business range through merging and acquisitions. Second, 
because a start-up does have some chances to become big once new opportunities are not yet 
covered, but much less when it has to challenge the incumbent oligopolists. Once new markets 
assume an oligopolistic structure, it is very difficult to revert it.  
 
This does not mean, of course, that the EU should not also actively encourage small firms in high-
tech sectors. Several instruments need to be reinforced, including competition policy preventing 
small firms to be squeezed, opening credit lines for risky ventures, improving the provision of 
scientific and technological knowledge through technology transfer strategies. Furthermore, the 
creation of a few large European high-tech public companies could hopefully help enlarge the 
productive capacity in the continent ultimately holding beneficial for small firms. 
 
 
Conclusions: the need to add another arrow to the EU economic policy instruments 
 
The exogenous crisis represented by Covid-19 will certainly accelerate the global productive 





adequately supported by government intervention but also steered towards the emerging sectors. 
Horizon Europe will continue being a crucial policy instrument both to enhance scientific and 
technological capabilities and to facilitate their dissemination across a rather heterogeneous 
economic fabric, going from Lisbon to Tallinn. But Horizon Europe budget is comparable to one of 
the top high-tech corporations and could not alone change the landscape. 
 
The massive resources made available through the Recovery Fund are needed to sustain the long-
term drop of investments in the EU, which has been especially detrimental for the innovative 
component. These resources will be administered by national authorities under the European 
Commission's supervision. However, it is less likely that they will lead to large-scale intra-
European technological projects. 
 
Other industrial policy instruments are needed, and we have here suggested to launch proper 
continental public corporations replicating what has been done with Airbus more than half a century 
ago. It is not difficult to identify those areas where there are greater scientific and technological 
opportunities and where the EU has either an advantage – such as Green technologies and 
Healthcare services – or where is lagging behind and it is in need to fill the gap with the incumbent 
and challenging nations – such as ICTs and Artificial Intelligence. These are the areas where 
genuine European champions could hopefully sustain a solid continental economic recovery. 
 
Although the endorsement of the European Council is certainly needed, these ventures could be 
initially pioneered by some governments only, in the hope that with time all EU members will join 
them. They will require building competencies, patient money, entrepreneurship, and leadership. 
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